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[T]he day may come when the rest of the animal creation 
may acquire those rights which never could have been 
withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. . . .[A] 
full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more 
rational, as well as a more conversible animal, than an 
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But 
suppose that it were otherwise, what would it avail? The 
question is not, Can they reason? Can they talk? but, Can 
they suffer?1 
                                                            - Jeremy Bentham 
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. 1986, Business 
Administration, University of South Dakota; B.S. 1989, Sociology, University of 
Iowa; M.A. 1995, Sociology, Pennsylvania State University; Ph.D. Candidate, 
Sociology, University of Minnesota. 
 1. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 283 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart, eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789). 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationships between humans and animals2 are complex 
and contradictory;3 we welcome them into our homes and treat 
them as members of the family,4 yet we inflict upon them all 
manner of atrocities.5  Although laws prohibiting cruelty to animals 
 
 2. Obviously humans are animals and drawing such a distinction creates a 
false dichotomy. In the interest of simplicity, however, I have adopted the 
standard, albeit speciesist, convention of separating humans from the rest of the 
animal kingdom and referring to animals other than human simply as “animals.” 
 3. “Most survey respondents report (1) that they are concerned about the 
well-being of animals, and (2) that they support the selective use of animals . . . .” 
S. Plous, Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals, 49 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 
11, 14 (1993). See also Clifton D. Bryant, The Zoological Connection: Animal-Related 
Human Behavior, 58 SOC. FORCES 399, 412 (1979) (discussing the influence of 
animals on human life); Corwin R. Kruse, The Relevance of “Animal Issues” for 
Sociology, ISAZ NEWSLETTER (Int’l Soc’y for Anthrozoology, Cambridge, U.K.), Mar. 
2001, at 2 (discussing the sociological relevance sociozoological studies) 
[hereinafter Kruse: Relevance]; Corwin R. Kruse, Animals and Human Society: 
Expanding the Sociological Imagination 1-5 (Apr. 19, 2000) (unpublished paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society) (on file with 
the author) (discussing the importance of human-animal studies for sociology) 
[hereinafter Kruse: Expanding]. See generally ARNOLD ARLUKE & CLINTON SANDERS, 
REGARDING ANIMALS (1996) (discussing human-animal relations in a variety of 
contexts). 
 4. See generally ALAN BECK & AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP (revised ed. 1996) (discussing the 
importance of companion animals in the lives of humans). A fondness for animal 
companionship is not limited to industrialized societies. See James Serpell & 
Elizabeth Paul, Pets and the Development of Positive Attitudes to Animals, in ANIMALS 
AND HUMAN SOCIETY: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 127 (Aubrey Manning & James 
Serpell eds., 1994). 
In the majority of hunting societies, as in the west, pet animals are often 
named and cared for like children. As infants they may be suckled at the 
breast alongside human infants. As they get older they are fed and kept 
out of harm’s way and, when they die, they are commonly mourned and 
sometimes honored with ritual burial. 
Id. at 130. 
 5. See, e.g., DAVID WOLFSON, BEYOND THE LAW: AGRIBUSINESS AND THE 
SYSTEMATIC ABUSE OF ANIMALS RAISED FOR FOOD OR FOOD PRODUCTION (1999) 
(discussing the inhumane conditions in which farm animals are born, raised, and 
slaughtered); Robert Reisman & Cindy A. Adams, Should Veterinarians Tell?, in 
CHILD ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE: LINKING THE CIRCLES OF 
COMPASSION FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 221 (Frank R. Ascione & Phil 
Arkow eds., 1999) (describing examples of animal abuse seen by veterinarians); 
Arnold Arluke & Carter Luke, Physical Cruelty Toward Animals in Massachusetts, 5 
SOC’Y AND ANIMALS 195 (1997) (discussing the types of cruelty inflicted upon 
animals in Massachusetts); Temple Grandin, Behavior of Slaughter Plant and Auction 
Employees Toward the Animals, 1 ANTHROZOÖS 205 (1988) (discussing abuse of 
animals by slaughter house workers). 
2
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exist in all states,6  “the law in practice does little, if anything, to 
protect animals . . . .”7 Animals, it seems, must struggle to find a 
place within our “scope of justice, the psychological boundary 
within which considerations of fairness govern our conduct.”8 
Our ambivalent attitude toward other creatures seems to stem 
from a number of factors:9 the dissociation of human consumptive 
practices from the infliction of harm;10 the use of conflict reduction 
mechanisms;11 in-group / out-group biases;12 and our perceived 
lack of similarity with other animals.13 Because of organized and 
well-funded opposition, getting more stringent animal protection 
laws enacted has been a slow process.14 
 
 6. Pamela, D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Laws: An Overview, 5 
ANIMAL L. 69, 69 (1999). A database of state anti-cruelty statutes can be found at 
http://www.animal-law.org/statutes/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). 
 7. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 4 (1995). 
 8. Susan Opotow, Predicting Protection: Scope of Justice and the Natural World, 50 
J. OF SOC. ISSUES 49, 50 (1994). 
 9. Plous, supra note 3 (discussing factors influencing the way people think 
about animals and the use thereof). 
 10. Id. at 14-25. Language is an important component of this. For example, 
animal-use industries and “sports” use impersonal terms such as “crops,” “tools,” or 
“resources” to refer to animals and speak of their killing euphemistically (e.g., 
“harvesting”). Id. at 15-17. Likewise, the remoteness of living animals from final 
products, both geographically and in appearance, serves to insulate consumers 
from effects of their practices. Id. at 18-19. “[T]o acquaint a customer with the 
knowledge that the lamb chops she has just purchased were part of the anatomy of 
one of those pretty little creatures we see gamboling in the fields at springtime is 
probably the surest way of turning her into a vegetarian.” Meat has Many Mysteries, 
MEAT TRADE JOURNAL, May 5, 1977, at 12, quoted in Plous, supra note 3, at 18. 
 11. Plous, supra note 3, at 25-29. As an example, despite substantial research 
to the contrary, people often deny that animals and humans feel pain in the same 
ways. Id. at 26. 
 12. Id. at 29-32. Out-group biases toward animals may manifest themselves in 
the much the same way as they do toward human out-groups; they are seen as 
inferior and relatively homogeneous. Id. at 29. The parallels become explicit when 
considering the treatment of human slaves. Id. at 30. See also MARJORIE SPEIGEL, 
THE DREADED COMPARISON: HUMAN AND ANIMAL SLAVERY (1988) (exploring the 
similarities between the treatment of human slaves and that of animals). 
 13. Plous, supra note 3, at 32-42. Generally, people demonstrate more 
concern for others (human or not) who are more similar to themselves.  Id. at 32. 
Animals seen as more similar to humans (e.g., apes) are thus given greater 
consideration that those seen as less similar (e.g., rats). Corwin R. Kruse, Gender, 
Views of Nature, and Support for Animal Rights, 7 SOC’Y AND ANIMALS 179, 194 (1999) 
(discussing past research examining treatment of different types of animals). See 
also Opotow, supra note 8 (discussing the effect of perceived similarity on scope of 
justice). 
 14. See generally ROBERT GARNER, POLITICAL ANIMALS: ANIMAL PROTECTION 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1998) (discussing federal animal 
protection legislation and politics in the United States and Great Britain). 
3
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Slow, however, does not mean impossible.15 Recently, 
Minnesota strengthened its anti-cruelty laws.16 Under the amended 
statute, it is now a felony17 to kill or inflict certain types of injury18 to 
a pet or companion animal19 or a service animal.20 Minnesota thus 
joins 32 other states21 and the District of Columbia, in assigning 
felony status to certain forms of animal abuse.22 
This note begins by tracing the development of anti-cruelty 
statutes over the last two centuries. Part II discusses the history of 
anti-cruelty legislation, including the philosophical and socio-
historical trends underlying these laws. Part III examines the recent 
changes to Minnesota’s anti-cruelty statute. Part IV analyzes these 
changes and proposes future modifications. Finally, part V 
examines current scholarship on animal abuse, discusses why the 
issue has typically been ignored by society, and poses challenges for 
the future. 
 
 15. See, e.g., Alicia Finigan, 2000 Legislative Review, 7 ANIMAL L. 145 (2001) 
(reviewing 2000 state and federal legislative and administrative actions affecting 
animals). 
 16. See 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, §§ 5-13 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20-235). 
 17. Previously, a violation of the anti-cruelty law was charged as either a 
misdemeanor or, if the second conviction within five years, a gross misdemeanor. 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9 (2000). 
 18. In relevant part, Minnesota law makes it a crime to: 
overdrive, overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or unjustifiably injure, 
maim, mutilate, or kill any animal, or cruelly work any animal when it is 
unfit for labor . . . . [or] willfully instigate or in any way further any act of 
cruelty to any animal or animals, or any act tending to produce cruelty to 
animals. 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 1, 7 (2000). 
 19. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 10 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(c)-(d), (f), (h)). See infra notes 143-155 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 10 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(e), (g)). See infra notes 156-158 and accompanying 
text. 
 21. The other states with felony anti-cruelty provisions are Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. Animal Protection Institute, State Animal Cruelty Laws, 
available at http://www.api4animals.org/doc.asp?ID=47 (last revised Sept. 24, 
2001). 
 22. Id. 
4
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTI-CRUELTY LAWS 
[L]aws and the enforcement or observance of laws, for the 
protection of dumb brutes from cruelty, are, in my 
judgment, among the best evidences of the justice and 
benevolence of men.23 
- Arnold, J. 
A.  British Beginnings 
Although restrictions on the human treatment of animals can 
be found throughout history,24 it was not until the 19th century that 
animals gained legal protection in the modern sense of the term.25 
Cruelty to animals was not a crime at common law.26 Animals were 
regarded as nothing more than property27, therefore they could be 
 
 23. Stephens v. State, 3 So. 458, 458 (Miss. 1888). 
 24. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 5:13-14 (King James). “Six days you shall labor, and 
do all your work; but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God; in it you 
shall not do any work, you, . . . or your ox, or your ass, or any of your cattle . . . .” 
Id. 
 25. See generally David Favre & Vivian Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty 
Laws During the 1800’s, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing the history of 
modern anti-cruelty legislation). 
 26. Stephens, 3 So. at 459 (noting that “common law recognized no right in 
such animals and punished no cruelty to them”); State v. Beekman, 27 N.J.L. 124, 
125 (1858) (stating the general proposition that “no injuries of a private nature 
[e.g., to animals], unless they some way concern the king or affect the public, are 
indictable at common law”); Larry Falkin, Taub v. State: Are State Anti-Cruelty 
Statutes Sleeping Giants?, 2 PACE ENV. L. REV. 255, 266 (1985) (noting that the 
common law provided no protections against animal cruelty); Favre & Tsang, 
supra note 25, at 5 (suggesting that cruelty to animals was not a criminal offense 
under English common law); Joseph G. Sauder, Enacting and Enforcing Felony 
Animal Cruelty Laws to Prevent Violence Against Humans, 6 ANIMAL L. 1, 3 (2000) 
(noting that animal cruelty was not a crime at common law). 
 27. Charles E. Friend, Animal Cruelty Laws: The Case for Reform, 8 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 201, 201-02 (1974) (discussing the concept of animals as property). See also 
Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 7-8 (discussing the property status of animals in 
early American law). See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 7 (discussing the history 
and legal ramifications of the property status of animals). Some scholars have 
suggested that an adequate resolution to the problem of animal cruelty will come 
only with the abandonment of property status. See, e.g., FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 
260. Others have proposed that the answer lies in a reworking of the existing 
property paradigm. See, e.g., David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 
DUKE L.J. 473, 477 (2000) (drawing on the language of trusts and bailments, as 
well as guardianship status, to propose that although humans may retain legal title 
to animals, at least some animals could be vested with equitable title in 
themselves). 
If an animal had equitable title, then a legal title holder would have 
obligations both to the state and to the equitable title holder, the self-
5
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used or treated as the owner wished.28 
Expanding urbanization following the industrial revolution 
brought about a shift in the way humans saw other animals.29 
“Victorians no longer viewed animals as commodities or tools, but 
as companions and even members of the family. For many, animals 
became objects of sentimentality rather than [simply] utility.”30 
It was in this shifting cultural milieu that modern anti-cruelty 
statutes were born.31 Sir William Pulteney introduced the first 
animal protection bill to Parliament on April 2, 1800.32 The bill, to 
prevent the practice of bull-baiting, was defeated by two votes.33 In 
1809, a second anti-cruelty bill, proposed by Lord Thomas  Erskine, 
was also narrowly defeated.34 
It was not until 22 years after Pulteney’s attempt that the first 
animal protection bill, known as Martin’s Act, was passed into law.35 
This law made the “wanton and cruel” beating or abuse of cattle, 
horses, and sheep a criminal offense.36 Violators could be punished 
by fines or imprisonment.37 Enforcement of the act was aided by 
the formation of the first animal protection organization, the 
 
owned animal. . . . The nature of the duty toward the self-owned animal 
will arise out of two primary legal sources, anti-cruelty laws and the 
concepts developed for defining the parent-child relationship. 
Id. at 494-95. 
 28. Friend, supra note 27, at 201-02. Because animals were seen as property, 
some acts of animal cruelty committed in public might be indictable as other 
offenses such as malicious mischief. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 5-6. Such an 
offense could be prosecuted, however, only if the animal in question belonged to 
someone else. Id. at 6. 
 29. See generally JAMES M. JASPER & DOROTHY NELKIN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS 
CRUSADE: THE GROWTH OF A MORAL PROTEST 26-41 (1992) (discussing the origins 
and growth of the animal rights movement). 
 30. Kruse, supra note 13, at 180. The common perception of animal 
protection as a “women’s issue” also seems to have its origins in this period of 
urbanization and industrialization. Id. at 180-81. As the split between public 
(male) and private (female) spheres of life grew, women, at least in the middle 
and upper classes, were expected to exert a civilizing influence upon society; part 
of this role included the protection of animals. Id. at 181. See also JASPER  & NELKIN, 
supra note 29, at 58. 
 31. See generally JASPER & NELKIN, supra note 29; HILDA KEAN, ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN SINCE 1800 (1998) (discussing the 
emergence and growth of the British animal rights movement). 
 32. KEAN, supra note 31, at 31. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 33. 
 35. Id. The bill passed on June 7, 1822. Id. at 34. 
 36. Id. See also Favre and Tsang, supra note 25, at 4. 
 37. KEAN, supra note 31, at 34. 
6
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Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), in 1824.38 
Notably, the true focus of these early attempts to protect 
animals were not the animals themselves, but humans.39 In addition 
to protecting property interests,40 the law concerned itself with the 
moral character of the populace.41 A popular engraving of the time, 
William Hogarth’s Four Stages of Cruelty, portrayed the supposed 
connection between cruelty to animals and crimes against 
humans.42 Anti-cruelty statutes were thus seen as a strike against the 
potential abuse of other humans.43 Lord Erskine’s speech to 
Parliament in support of his anti-cruelty bill reflects this view; “This 
extension of benevolence to [animals] . . . will reflect back upon 
our sympathies to one another . . . .”44 
There was also more than a touch of class-based antipathy in 
these early statutes.45 Indeed, Professor Tester suggests that the 
primary motivation for anti-cruelty statutes was to control and 
civilize the lower class rather than to provide for the well-being of 
animals.46 More humane treatment of animals “became a 
distinguishing feature of  . . . membership of a new middle class 
and a respectable working class.”47 The blood sports of the poor, seen 
as emblematic of a “violent and unrestrained culture,”48 became 
prime candidates for reform.49 
 
 38. Id. at 35-38. The SPCA became “Royal” (RSPCA) when it achieved the 
patronage of Queen Victoria in 1840. LAWRENCE FINSEN & SUSAN FINSEN, THE 
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: FROM COMPASSION TO RESPECT 31 (1994); 
KEAN, supra note 31, at 35. 
 39. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 6. 
 40. Id. at 5-6. 
 41. Id. at 6. “The pain and suffering of animals was not as much of a legal 
concern . . . as was the moral impact of the action on humans.” Id. 
 42. FINSEN & FINSEN, supra note 38, at 37. 
 43. STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
44 (2000). 
 44. KEAN, supra note 31, at 33 (quoting Lord Erskine, Cruelty to Animals: The 
Speech of Lord Erskine in the House of Peers, May 15, 1809 (1824)). Such 
concerns are still a major factor in the debate over anti-cruelty legislation. See infra 
notes 178-182 and accompanying text. 
 45. See generally Adrian Franklin, On Fox-hunting and Angling: Norbert Elias and 
the ‘Sportisation’ Process”, 9 J. OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 432, 452 (1996). 
 46. Keith Tester, The Pleasure of the Rich is the Labour of the Poor: Some Comments 
on Norbert Elias’s “An Essay on Sport and Violence”, 2 J. OF HISTORICAL SOC. 161, 169-70 
(1989) (discussing the class-based nature of early animal protection laws and the 
intricacies of social class and animal protection laws). 
 47. KEAN, supra note 31, at 24 (emphasis added). 
 48. Franklin, supra note 45, at 440. 
 49. Id. As Professor Franklin points out, blood sports enjoyed by the upper 
classes, such as fox hunting, were not targeted by the new anti-cruelty statutes. Id. 
7
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B.  The American Experience 
The first American anti-cruelty statute actually passed the year 
before Martin’s Act became law in Britain.50 In 1821, Maine made it 
a crime for “any person [to] cruelly beat any horse or cattle . . . .”51 
This impact of this law, however, was relatively minor.52 
In 1829, New York passed an anti-cruelty statute that became a 
model for a number of other states,53 including Minnesota.54 The 
first part of the New York law made it a misdemeanor to 
“maliciously kill, maim or wound any horse, ox or other cattle, or 
any sheep, belonging to another . . . .”55 The second part focused 
on cruelty regardless of ownership, prohibiting anyone from cruelly 
beating or torturing horses, cattle, or sheep, “whether belonging to 
himself or another.”56 
The second section of the law represented a step forward in 
that it applied regardless of ownership.57 There were several 
substantial limitations however: the law prohibited only affirmative 
acts,58 it applied only to a limited number of commercially valuable 
animals,59 and it “required prosecutors to prove that the defendant 
acted with malice.”60 
 
at 440-41. 
 50. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 8-9. 
 51. Id. at 8 (quoting Me. Laws ch. IV, § 7 (1821)). 
 52. Id. at 9. “[T]here is no record that this law was followed by the creation of 
any public organization to help enforce the law or compel any change in public 
conduct . . . . It marked the initiation of concern, but not the birth of a social 
movement.” Id. 
 53. Sauder, supra note 26, at 3. 
 54. Id. at 3 n.11. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 55. N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 6, § 26(1) (1829), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, 
at 9. 
 56. N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 6, § 26(2) (1829), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, 
at 9. 
 57. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 10. The different language in the two 
parts created some perplexing possibilities. 
One result of [this] language was that it was not illegal to maliciously kill 
or maim your own animal. The legislature most likely presumed that 
financial self-interest would protect against this possibility. However, if 
you killed your own horse by beating it to death, the beating, but not the 
killing, was illegal. 
Id. 
 58. Id. Although individuals were enjoined from committing certain acts, they 
were not mandated to care for animals; starving one’s horse to death would not 
have been illegal. Id. 
 59. Id. at 11. Torturing a dog, for example, was not yet illegal. Id. 
 60. Sauder, supra note 26, at 5. This allowed defendants to absolve themselves 
by invoking a “good-faith effort to train” defense, thereby belying any intent to 
8
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A revised anti-cruelty law, passed in 1867,61 began to address 
these limitations.62 First, the statute went beyond simply prohibiting 
affirmative acts, it made it illegal to deprive an animal of “necessary 
sustenance.”63 Imposing this duty of care may be seen as an 
indication of increasing concern for the well-being of animals.64 
Second, the new law applied to “any living creature.”65 “This 
marvelously sweeping statement finally eliminated the limitation 
that protection was only for animals of commercial value. All 
provisions of this section applied regardless of ownership of the 
animal.”66 Finally, the qualifier “maliciously” was removed from all 
of the prohibited acts.67 The focus thus began to shift from the 
subjective mind-set of the accused to the objective harm to the 
animal.68 
This statute was also notable for several other provisions. First, 
it allowed anyone to enter private premises to provide care for an 
animal that did not have adequate food or water.69 In addition, the 
act provided to agents of the newly formed American Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (A.S.P.C.A.),70 the power to 
 
harm. Id. See, e.g., State v. Avery, 44 N.H. 392, 397 (1862) (“[I]f the beating was 
solely for the purpose of training, however severe it might be, it would not be 
malicious, within the meaning of the statute, and therefore it would be no 
offense . . . .”) 
 61. N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 6, §§ 375.2-9 (1867), cited in Sauder, supra note 26, at 5 
n.30. 
 62. The new law provided that: 
If any person shall overdrive, overload, torture, torment, deprive of 
necessary sustenance, or unnecessarily or cruelly beat, or needlessly 
mutilate or kill, or cause or procure to be overdriven, overloaded, 
tortured, tormented or deprived of necessary sustenance, or to be 
unnecessarily or cruelly beaten, or needlessly mutilated, or killed as 
aforesaid any living creature, every such offender shall, for every such 
offense, be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
N.Y. REV. STAT. § 375.1 (1867), quoted in Sauder, supra note 26, at 5 n.30. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 10, 16-18. 
 65. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 375.1 (1867), quoted in Sauder, supra note 26, at 5 n.30. 
 66. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 16. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. See also Sauder, supra note 26, at 5. This change limited the ability of 
individuals to use the “training defense.” Id. 
 69. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 375.4 (1867), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 16. 
 70. The A.S.P.C.A. was modeled on the R.S.P.C.A.and granted a charter by 
the New York legislature on April 10, 1866. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 13. Its 
first president, Henry Bergh, was instrumental in the group’s formation and 
played a major role in the passage of anti-cruelty legislation in the state. See id. at 
13-17. 
9
Kruse: Baby Steps: Minnesota Raises Certain Forms of Animal Cruelty to F
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
10_KRUSE 4/18/2002  5:07 PM 
1658 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
enforce the provisions of the law and arrest violators.71 In an 
innovative and pragmatic move, the statute provided that the 
A.S.P.C.A.  was to receive all fines collected in violation of the anti-
cruelty law.72 Finally, as a result of substantial lobbying, the act 
contained the first exemption for medical research.73 This 
exemption foreshadowed many future legislative debates.74 
Thanks in large part to A.S.P.C.A. president Henry Bergh, the 
press took notice of the New York legislation.75 Soon, a number of 
other states76 had passed similar legislation and chartered local 
chapters of the S.P.C.A. to help with enforcement.77 The push to 
enact anti-cruelty statutes continued throughout the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and by the 1920s, such laws existed in most 
states.78 
Discerning exactly how the courts interpreted the early statutes 
is difficult because the record is minimal.79 It is likely that many 
cases never made it beyond the trial court;80 the state was unlikely 
to appeal acquittals,81 and, given the relatively small fine 
accompanying a conviction, few guilty defendants found an appeal 
worth the legal costs.82 We are thus left to extrapolate from a 
limited number of appellate decisions.83 “Each state has only a 
handful of decisions prior to 1900, and some have no reported 
decisions concerning cruelty laws.”84 
One of the main functions of the court in these cases was to 
define what was meant by the term “cruelty.”85 Although there was 
variance across courts, Professor Favre suggests that combining 
 
 71. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 375.8 (1867), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 17. 
 72. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 17. 
 73. N.Y. REV. STAT. § 375.10 (1867), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 
18. 
 74. See infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text. 
 75. Favre and Tsang, supra note 25, at 21. 
 76. Among the states passing laws modeled on the New York act were 
Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Hampshire and New Jersey. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Sauder, supra note 26, at 7. 
 79. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 22-23. 
 80. Id. at 22. 
 81. Id. at 23. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 24. Defining cruelty remains a problem for both the legal system 
and criminologists. See generally Piers Beirne, For a Nonspeciesist Criminology: Animal 
Abuse as an Object of Study, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 117 (1999) (discussing the difficulties 
in defining animal abuse). 
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decisions leads to the following general definition: cruelty was 
“human conduct, by act or omission . . . which inflicts pain and 
suffering on a nonhuman animal . . . without legally acceptable86 
justifi[cation].”87 Simply killing an animal was typically not enough 
to convict a person under these statutes, the killing needed to be 
done in a cruel fashion.88 
A second primary task for the court was to determine which 
creatures came under the protection of the statutes.89 Once again, 
there was substantial variation between jurisdictions.90  The 
Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, felt that the statutory phrase 
“any living creature”91 should be construed to apply to “all animate 
creation . . . from the largest and noblest to the smallest and most 
insignificant.”92 In contrast, as recently as 1973, the Kansas 
Supreme Court held that gamecocks were not meant to be 
included within the statutory phrase “any animal.”93 
III. THE MINNESOTA STATUTE 
The evolution of anti-cruelty laws in Minnesota in large 
measure mirrors that of such laws in the United States generally. 
The first statute prohibiting animal abuse predated statehood;94 it 
was enacted by the legislative assembly of the Territory of 
Minnesota during their second session in 1851.95 An early case, 
United States v. Gideon,96 provides a glimpse of the attitudes 
 
 86. Legal acceptability can be drawn from “legislative language or socially 
acceptable custom.” Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 24. 
 87. Id. Many atrocities could of course be “justified.” See, e.g., supra note 60. 
This issue is still problematic today. See infra notes 244-254 and accompanying text. 
 88. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 24-25 (citing Horton v. State, 27 So. 468, 
468 (Ala. 1900)) (holding that “the mere act of killing an animal, without more, is 
not cruelty”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 456 (1881). 
 92. Id. at 458. 
 93. State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne, 505 P.2d 732, 734 (1973). Early on, 
Minnesota took a similarly narrow approach. See infra notes 104-106 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. Minnesota became a state in 1858. 
 95. REV. STAT., ch.  107, § 18 (1851). The statute read, in its entirety, “[e]very 
person who shall cruelly beat or torture any horse, ox, or other animal, whether 
belonging to himself or another, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail, not more than thirty days, or by fine not exceeding fifty dollars, nor less than 
five dollars.” Id. 
 96. 1 Minn. 292 (1856). 
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prevailing during this time. 
In 1854, Peter Gideon shot a dog owned by George Bertram97 
and was indicted by a Hennepin County grand jury for “willfully 
and maliciously killing” the animal.98 After his conviction, Gideon 
appealed on several grounds: first, that the facts stated in the 
indictment did not constitute a public offense;99 second, that no 
value of the dog was alleged or proved;100 and, third, that malice 
was proved only against the dog, not against Bertram.101 The court 
agreed with the appellant and reversed the district court.102 
The law under which the charges were brought provided that 
“every person who shall willfully and maliciously kill, maim or 
disfugure any horses, cattle, or other beasts of another person . . . 
shall be punished.”103 In his decision, Judge Sherburne held that 
dogs were not covered by the statute as they were not included in 
the term “beasts.”104 
[I]t is but reasonable to suppose that the intention of the 
law was, in using the terms “beasts,”  to include such other 
animals as may properly come under the name of beasts, 
and as have an intrinsic value in the same sense that there 
is value in hoses, oxen and cows. The term beasts may well 
be intended to include asses, mules, sheep, swine, and, 
perhaps, some other domesticated animals, but it would 
be going quite too far to hold that dogs were intended.105 
Because the anti-cruelty law applied only to commercially 
valuable animals, shooting the dog was not an indictable offense 
under the statute.106 
In addition, the court held that the trial court had erred when 
it instructed the jury that they could convict if they found that the 
defendant had acted with malice toward either the dog or his 
owner.107 Citing an inability to find any precedent for a cruelty 
 
 97. Id. at 295. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 296. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 296-97. 
 103. REV. STAT., ch. 101,  § 39 (1854), quoted in Gideon, 1 Minn. at 296. 
 104. Gideon, 1 Minn. at 296. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. The court also held that because “the simple word or name of dog” 
implied no value in and of itself, some monetary value needed to be pled for the 
verdict to be sustained. Id. at 297. 
 107. Id. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/2
10_KRUSE 4/18/2002  5:07 PM 
2002] BABY STEPS: ANIMAL CRUELTY 1661 
conviction based upon malice toward the animal, the Judge 
Sherburne ruled that for the conviction to stand, it was “necessary 
to prove malice against the owner.”108 Even with respect to animals 
that had “intrinsic value,” the law was thus interpreted to protect 
exclusively human interests. 
After statehood, the anti-cruelty statute referred to above 
became state law.109 The location of the statute in the Minnesota 
code is quite telling. Many early anti-cruelty laws tended to be 
located in the criminal code chapters dealing with “Offences 
Against  Chastity, Decency, and Morality,” along with such offenses 
as blasphemy and fornication.110 Minnesota fits with this pattern; 
“the section after the cruelty to animals section prohibited 
performing labor or attending a dance on the Lords [sic] Day,”111 
and  the section preceding it barred persons from constructing 
roads or railways through burial grounds without the permission of 
the town, religious institution or person owning the property.112 It 
appears that the concern was still for human morality rather than 
animal suffering. 
The current anti-cruelty statute can be traced back to 1905.113  
Among other things, this law made it a crime for any person to 
[o]verdrive, overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or 
unjustifiably injure, maim, mutilate, or kill any animal, or 
cruelly work the same when unfit for labor, whether 
belonging to himself or another;114  [d]eprive of necessary 
food, water, or shelter any animal of which he has charge 
or control;115 [and] . . . [w]ilfully set on foot, instigate, or 
in any way further any act of cruelty to animals, or any act 
tending to produce such cruelty.116 
 
 108. Id. “Maliciously” was not given such an anthropocentric reading in all 
states. See Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 14-15. For example, the New Hampshire 
court applied the term broadly; “malice [is] not limited to ill-will to an animal, or 
its owner, or to wanton cruelty but [that an] act will be malicious if it results from 
any bad or evil motive . . . .” State v. Avery, 44 N.H. 392 (N.H. 1862), quoted in 
Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 14 n.67. 
 109. MINN. STAT. § 96.18 (1858), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 12 & 
n.52. 
 110. Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 11 & n.49. 
 111. MINN. STAT. § 96.19 (1858), cited in Favre & Tsang, supra note 25, at 11 
n.49. 
 112. MINN. STAT. § 96.17 (1858). 
 113. REV. LAWS, ch. 102, §§ 5151-5160 (1905). 
 114. Id. at § 5152.1. 
 115. Id. at § 5152.2. 
 116. Id. at § 5152.7. 
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Importantly, the act defined “animal” to include every living 
creature other than humans,117 thereby precluding decisions along 
the lines of Gideon.118 In addition, the law defined “cruelty” and 
“torture” synonymously to refer to “every act, omission, or neglect 
whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain, suffering, or death shall 
be caused or permitted.” 119 
Until recently, and with only minor revisions, the 1905 
language formed the basis of the modern anti-cruelty law.120 Like 
the basic language, penalties for animal abuse had, until recently, 
changed only slightly; “[a] person who fail[ed] to comply with any 
provision of [the anti-cruelty statute] [was] guilty of a 
misdemeanor. A person convicted of a second or subsequent 
violation . . . within five years of a previous violation . . . [was] guilty 
of a gross misdemeanor.”121 
In 2001, the Minnesota legislature amended the anti-cruelty 
law to raise certain types of animal abuse to felony status.122 In 
doing so, the state codified new standards of injury that focus on 
the bodily harm to the animal,123 rather than the more ambiguous 
criterion of “unnecessary pain and suffering.”124 
“Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury which 
involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or 
which causes a temporary but substantial loss or 
 
 117. Id. at § 5151. 
 118. 1 Minn. 292 (1856). See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
 119. Rev. Laws, ch. 102, § 5151 (1905). 
 120. See MINN. STAT. § 343.21 (2000). According to the current statute, “[n]o 
person shall overdrive, overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or unjustifiably 
injure, maim, mutilate, or kill any animal, or cruelly work any animal when unfit 
for labor, whether it belongs to that person or to another person.” § 343.21, subd. 
1. “No person shall deprive any animal over which the person has charge or 
control of necessary food, water, or shelter.” Id. at subd. 2. “No person shall keep 
any cow or other animal in any enclosure without providing wholesome exercise 
and change of air.” Id. at subd. 3. “No person shall feed any cow on food which 
produces impure or unwholesome milk.” Id. at subd. 4. “No person shall abandon 
any animal.” Id. at subd. 5. “No person shall allow any maimed, sick, infirm, or 
disabled animal to lie in any street, road, or other public place for more than 
three hours after receiving notice of the animals condition.” Id. at subd. 6. “No 
person shall willfully instigate or in any way further any act of cruelty to any animal 
or animals, or any act tending to produce cruelty to animals.” Id. at subd. 7. 
 121. Id. at subd. 9 (2000). In 1905, all violations were misdemeanors. REV. 
LAWS, ch. 102, § 5152 (1905). 
 122. See 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, §§ 5-13 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20-235). 
 123. See id. at §§ 7-8 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20). 
 124. See MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 3 (2000). 
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impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily member to 
a companion animal or service animal.125 . . . “Great bodily 
harm” means bodily injury which creates a high 
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member 
or organ, or other serious bodily harm to a service animal 
or a pet or companion animal.126 
Significantly, these bodily harm criteria apply only to service 
animals127 and pets or companion animals128. Other classes of 
animals are still subject to the more vague and subjective 
standard.129 The law was structured this way to minimize opposition 
from powerful agricultural, hunting, and animal research 
interests.130 
During the 1999-2000 biennium, Legislative Efforts for Animal 
Protection  (L.E.A.P.)131 authored a bill that would have provided 
increased protection for all animals.132 This version of the 
legislation was supported by a number of organizations and 
individuals including the Minnesota Humane Society,133 Animal 
Ark,134 the Humane Society of Lyon County,  Minnesota,135 and 
 
 125. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 7 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 8). 
 126. Id. at § 8 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 9). 
 127. “‘Service animal’ means an animal trained to assist a person with a 
disability.” Id. at § 6 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 7). In 
addition to “substantial” and “great” bodily harm, it is illegal to “intentionally and 
without justification cause [any] bodily harm to a service animal while it is 
providing service or while it is in the custody of the person it serves.” Id. at § 9 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 8a). 
 128. “‘Pet or companion animal’ includes any animal owned, possessed by, 
cared for, or controlled by a person for the present or future enjoyment of that 
person or another as a pet or companion animal, or any stray pet or companion 
animal.” Id. at § 5 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20, subd. 6). 
 129. See generally id. at §§ 5-13 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.20-
235). 
 130. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, President, Legislative Efforts for 
Animal Protection, in St. Paul, Minn. (Oct. 18, 2001). 
 131. L.E.A.P. is a local non-profit organization that engages in lobbying with 
respect to legislation affecting animals. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Letter from Erin K. Jordahl, Executive Director, Minnesota Humane 
Society, to members of the Senate Agriculture and Rural Development Committee 
(Feb. 3, 2000) (on file with author). 
 134. Letter from Marlene Foote, President, Animal Ark (Feb.  3, 2000) (on file 
with author). Animal Ark is a nonprofit, no kill animal shelter located in Hastings, 
Minn. with corporate headquarters in St. Paul. Id. 
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Minneapolis City Council Member Barbara Johnson.136 Due to 
pressure from various animal use lobbies, however, exemptions 
were added prior to the bill’s introduction.137 Because the current 
anti-cruelty law does not include any exemptions, L.E.A.P. and a 
number of other organizations pulled their support from the bill.138 
The bill subsequently passed the Senate139 but died in the House.140 
The 2001 bill attempted to avoid these problems by limiting 
 
 135. Letter from Stacy Kesteloot, Coordinator, Humane Society of Lyon 
County, Marshall, Minn. (on file with author). 
 136. Letter from Barbara A. Johnson, Minneapolis City Council Member, 
Fourth Ward (Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author). 
 137. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, supra note 130. As introduced, the 
bill contained the following language: 
Unless gross negligence can be shown, cruelty does not include:(1) 
commonly accepted veterinary procedures performed by a licensed 
veterinarian; (2) lawful slaughtering of animals; (3) scientific research 
activities performed in accordance with federal and state laws and 
regulations by licensed or registered facilities; (4) commonly accepted 
humane animal husbandry practices; or (5) the taking of wild animals in 
accordance with state, federal, or local laws. . . . The taking of wild 
animals in violation of federal, state, or local laws is not prima facie 
evidence of cruelty to animals. 
S.F. 613, 81st Legislative Session (1999-2000), http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us 
(introduced Feb. 8, 1999). This language was also included in the companion bill 
in the House of Representatives. H.F. 1142, 81st Legislative Session (1999-2000), 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us (introduced Feb. 25, 1999). 
The bill was quickly amended to make the exemptions even broader; many acts 
were excluded from the definition of cruelty even if grossly negligent. 
“Cruelty” does not include (1) commonly accepted veterinary procedures 
performed by a licensed veterinarian; (2) lawful slaughtering of animals; 
(3) scientific research activities performed in accordance with federal 
and state laws and regulations by licensed or registered facilities; (4) 
commonly accepted animal husbandry practices; (5) the taking of wild 
animals in accordance with state, federal, or local game and fish laws; or 
(6) acts of God . . . . 
S.F. 613, 2nd Eng., 81st Leg. Sess. (1999-2000), http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us 
(posted Mar. 17, 1999). 
The final Senate version included the above language with one exception: it 
exempted “the taking of wild animals by hunting, trapping, and angling,” 
regardless of whether such actions were in accordance with established game or 
fish laws. S.F. 613, 4th Eng., 81st Leg. Sess. (1999-2000), 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us (posted Feb. 7, 2000). 
 138. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, supra note 130. See also letter from 
Erin K. Jordahl, supra note 133 (“if this bill were to become law . . . more animals 
in Minnesota would be excluded from protection under the anti-cruelty laws than 
would be protected”). 
 139. Minnesota Legislative Information Service, Senate Bill Status, at 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). 
 140. Minnesota Legislative Information Service, House Bill Status, at 
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). 
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the scope of the increased penalties.141 A coalition of animal 
protection groups was built and lobbyists met with representatives 
from various animal-use interests to work out acceptable 
language.142 As a result, opposition from these groups was 
minimal.143 Initially, some  legislators were concerned with the 
“proportionality” of the bill,144 however Senate counsel reported 
“that there were stricter penalties in place for bodily harm felonies 
perpetrated against humans.”145 
The new law provides a graduated series of penalties based on 
(1) the level of bodily harm, (2) whether the animal is a 
companion animal or a service animal, (3) whether the act was 
done to intimidate another person, and (4) whether the accused 
has a prior cruelty conviction.146 Punishments for acts other than 
those discussed below, remain at prior levels.147 
First-time intentional violations of the “torture”148 or 
“cruelty”149 provisions of the anti-cruelty statute that result in 
“substantial bodily harm to a pet or companion animal may be 
[punished by] imprisonment for not more than one year or . . . a 
fine of not more than $3,000, or both.”150 The maximum penalty 
for intentionally abusing a pet or companion animal is increased to 
two years in prison, a $5,000 fine, or both, if (1) the person has had 
a gross misdemeanor or felony conviction for animal abuse within 
the previous five years;151 (2) the act was done “to threaten, 
intimidate, or terrorize another person;”152 or (3) the act results in 
death or great bodily harm to the animal.153 The potential penalties 
 
 141. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, supra note 130. 
 142. Id. Among those consulted were the Board of Animal Health, the 
Minnesota Veterinary Medical Association, and lobbyists for the agriculture 
industry. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Committee Update, SENATE BRIEFLY (Minn. Senate Publ’ns  Office), Feb. 23, 
2001, at 4, available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/briefly/index.htm. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 10 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9). 
 147. Id. “[E]xcept as otherwise provided in [the amended statute],” violations 
remain misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors. Id. 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 1 (2000). See supra note 120. 
 149. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 7 (2000). See supra note 120. 
 150. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 10 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(b)). 
 151. Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(c)). 
 152. Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(f)). 
 153. Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(d)). 
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are still greater if both of the last two conditions apply.154 
[If] the violation results in death or great bodily harm to a 
pet or companion animal, and the act is done to threaten, 
intimidate, or terrorize another person, [the offender] 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 
four years or to payment of a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or both.155 
The penalties for harming a service animal are greater than 
those for the same level of abuse against a pet or companion 
animal.156 Intentionally causing substantial bodily harm to a service 
animal, without justification, is punishable by up to two years in 
prison, a fine of $5,000, or both.157 If the act causes great bodily 
harm or death, the maximum penalty is 4 years in prison, a fine of 
$10,000, or both.158 
In addition to facing fines or imprisonment, a person 
convicted of violating the anti-cruelty law, must turn over to the 
authorities any pet or companion animal in his or her custody159 or 
control,160 “unless the court determines that the person is able and 
fit to provide adequately for an animal.”161 If there is evidence to 
the contrary, the burden of proof is on the offender to 
“demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence” the ability to 
adequately provide for the animal’s needs.162 The court may also 
limit the offender’s further possession of pets or companion 
animals.163 
Additionally, the court has recourse to other sanctions it 
considers appropriate.164 These potential conditions include, but 
are not limited to: 
1. imposing a probation period during which the person 
may not have ownership, custody, or control of a pet or 
 
 154. Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(h)). 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. See supra notes 127-28 (defining “service animal” and “pet or companion 
animal”). 
 157. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 10 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(e)). 
 158. Id. (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 9(g)). 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10. 
 160. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 11 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10). 
 161. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10 (2000). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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companion animal;165 
2. requiring periodic visits of the person by an animal 
control officer or agent appointed pursuant to section 
343.01, subdivision 1;166 
3. requiring performance by the person of community 
service . . . ; 167 and 
4. requiring the person to receive psychological, 
behavioral, or other counseling.168 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE 
A.  Benefits of the New Provisions 
Although far from perfect, the amended statute represents a 
substantial improvement from the previous law. The new felony 
provisions are important in a number of ways. 
First, they may encourage prosecutors to bring charges.169 
Given the competition for scarce resources within prosecutors’ 
offices, many may be loathe to spend valuable time developing a 
case where the likely penalty is a small fine or community service.170 
The possibility of a prison term and substantial fine provide a 
stronger incentive to pursue cruelty cases.171 Additionally, in plea 
 
 165. Id. at subd. 10(1). 
 166. Id. at subd. 10(2). Section 343.01 of the Minnesota Statutes provides for 
the creation of “[a] state federation of county and district societies for the 
prevention of cruelty to animals.” MINN. STAT. § 343.01, subd. 1 (2000). Minnesota 
Federated Humane Societies is the organization created pursuant to this statute. 
The federation and all county and district societies may appoint agents for the 
purpose of investigating or otherwise assisting lawfully empowered officials in the 
prosecution of persons charged with cruelty to animals. Appointed agents must 
have training and experience in activities relating to prevention of cruelty to 
animals or enforcement of laws relating to cruelty to animals. 
Id. 
 167. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10(3) (2001). The statute formerly suggested 
that this community service be performed “in a humane facility,” but this language 
has been removed. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 11 (codified as 
amended at MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10 (3)). 
 168. 2001 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 8, art. 8, § 11 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10(4)). Previously the statute suggested simply 
“behavioral” counseling. MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10(4) (2000)). 
 169. Mitchell Fox, Treating Serious Animal Abuse as a Serious Crime, in CHILD 
ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE 306, 311 (Frank R. Ascione & Phil 
Arkow, eds., 1999) 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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negotiations, “tougher anti-cruelty laws provide prosecutors with a 
powerful bargaining tool . . . which can be used to mandate 
counseling, treatment, and fines.”172 
Second, the increased penalties allow for better tracking of 
abusers.173 Misdemeanors are no longer reported by the FBI;174 
without felony provisions, offenders who move out of state leave no 
criminal trail.175 A felony conviction provides a history upon which 
future prosecutors may draw when making sentencing 
recommendations.176 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the enhanced penalties 
send a message to the public that animal cruelty is a serious 
offense. Many members of the public downplay the significance of 
abuse;177 a stronger response by the legal system may help change 
this view. 
Finally, the newly amended law may help to protect humans as 
well as animals.178 A growing number of studies suggest that there 
may be a “link” between cruelty to animals and interpersonal 
violence.179 Ideally, the presence or absence of this “link” should 
not affect the achievement of the goal of protecting animals, but in 
the real world of politics it plays a significant role.180 Indeed it was 
important in the debate over the bill in the Minnesota legislature;181 
 
 172. Sauder, supra note 26, at 17. 
 173. Id. at 16. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Arluke & Luke, supra note 5, at 195-96. Prosecutors and judges are 
often among these individuals. See infra notes 255-267 and accompanying text. 
 178. See generally Sauder, supra note 26 (suggesting that violence against 
humans may be reduced through the enforcement of felony anti-cruelty statutes). 
 179. See, e.g., Stephen R. Kellert & Alan R. Felthous, Childhood Cruelty toward 
Animals among Criminals and Noncriminals, in CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 194 (Randall Lockwood & Frank R. Ascione eds., 1998) 
(reporting that criminals were more likely than noncriminals to have abused 
animals as children); Arnold Arluke et al., The Relationship of Animal Abuse to 
Violence and Other Forms of Antisocial Behavior, 14 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 963 
(suggesting that animal cruelty is related to other antisocial behaviors); Frank R. 
Ascione et al., The Abuse of Animals and Domestic Violence, 5 ANIMALS AND SOC’Y 205 
(discussing the relationship between animal abuse and domestic violence). 
 180. See Patrick Dougherty, The Legislator’s Perspective on Preventing Family 
Violence, in CHILD ABUSE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE 288, 295 (Frank 
R. Ascione & Phil Arkow eds., 1999) (advising that “[t]he more you can establish 
the link between abuse and violence of any kind and the destruction of our 
families . . . the more success you will have in changing negative attitudes . . . and 
positively influencing legislators’ votes . . . .”). 
 181. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, supra note 130. See also Committee 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/2
10_KRUSE 4/18/2002  5:07 PM 
2002] BABY STEPS: ANIMAL CRUELTY 1669 
without a focus on the “link,” passage would have been 
impossible.182 
Although methodological concerns exist regarding some of 
the research in this area,183 the findings suggest possible 
connections between various forms of violence.184 As a result, law 
enforcement has begun to take note; the FBI considers animal 
abuse to be a warning sign of the potential for other violent 
crimes.185 
In light of this research, increased penalties for abusing an 
animal to intimidate another person may be especially important. A 
number of studies point to the prevalence of animal abuse in 
domestic violence situations.186 Actual or threatened abuse of 
animals serves to intimidate and control human victims in a 
number of ways.187 “Companion animals may be hostages, tools of 
 
Update, supra note 144, at 4. 
 182. Interview with Cristy Gaffney Kruse, supra note 130. 
 183. Two methodological issues are especially important. First, much of the 
research has relied on inmates in prisons and mental institutions. Arluke et al., 
supra note 179, at 966. This leads to concerns that at least part of the relationship 
may result from “selective disclosure for the sake of self-presentation . . . .” Id. 
Second, violence is typically the sole dependent variable in the research. Id. at 967. 
This practice overlooks the possibility that the link between animal abuse and 
other behaviors may be more prevalent than typically thought. Id. “[I]f the 
dependent variable were antisocial behavior, including but not limited to 
interpersonal aggression, and if samples from the general population were 
studied, then society may have even more reason to pay attention to animal abuse, 
if connections are found here.” Id. 
 184. Id. The common perception is that of a “graduation hypothesis” wherein 
offenders begin by abusing animals and graduate to abusing humans. Id. at 963-64. 
Recent research suggests that a “deviance generalization hypothesis” may be more 
accurate. Id. at 970. “Rather than being a predictor or a distinct step in the 
develpment of increasingly criminal or violent behavior, animal abuse . . . is one of 
many antisocial behaviors committed by individuals . . . .” Id. This view has also 
been referred to as the “constellation” hypothesis; abusers are not picky, they “lash 
out at whatever target is available and vulnerable.” Kruse: Expanding, supra note 3, 
at 22. 
 185. Randall Lockwood and Ann Church, Deadly Serious: An FBI Perspective on 
Animal Cruelty, in CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 241 (Randall 
Lockwood & Frank R. Ascione eds., 1998). 
 186. See, e.g., Frank Ascione, Battered Women’s Reports of Their Partners’ and Their 
Children’s Cruelty to Animals, 1 J. OF EMOTIONAL ABUSE 119 (reporting threatened or 
actual abuse of pets by partners of 71 percent of battered women who owned 
pets); Ascione et al., supra note 179 (discussing the high incidence of pet abuse by 
partners of battered women); Clifton P. Flynn, Woman’s Best Friend: Pet Abuse and 
the Role of Companion Animals in the Lives of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 162 (finding that almost half of battered women with pets reported that 
their partners had harmed or threatened to harm those pets). 
 187. See Clifton P. Flynn, Battered Women and Their Animal Companions: Symbolic 
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humiliation, or threatening examples of potential human pain that 
could be inflicted.”188 
Companion animals may provide comfort and emotional 
support to women who are victims of domestic violence.189 
Similarly, abused children often turn to pets for love and solace.190 
Unfortunately, the bonds that exist between humans and other 
animals make those animals a useful instrument of domination in 
the hands of an abuser.191 Women may delay leaving their batterers 
out of concern for the well-being of their companion animals.192 
Because of this, Sociology Professor Clifton Flynn has suggested 
that domestic abuse shelters should work to provide housing for 
pets, perhaps in conjunction with local animal shelters, to 
encourage women to seek help.193 
The potential for using animals as a means of control remains 
after the victim has left her partner.194 When companion animals 
are left behind, abusers may harm or threaten the animals “to 
intimidate victims into dropping charges and/or returning 
home.”195 As an example, consider the following account from a 
newly-minted social worker: 
My first day as a newly hired, freshly graduated, starry-eyed 
counselor at the local battered women’s shelter almost 
made me run home crying. Not because of the black eyes 
and bruises that shadowed the women’s faces. . . . I was 
prepared for that (as much as one can be) . . . . What I 
wasn’t prepared for were the pictures my first client 
brought to show me, apologetically, to explain why she 
had to return home. The pictures were of her “loving” 
husband cutting her beloved dog’s ears off with a pair of 
garden shears. He had sent the ears along, too, but her 
 
Interaction Between Human and Nonhuman Animals, 8 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 99, 107-13 
(2000) (discussing various types of pet abuse and its effect on battered women). 
 188. Carol D. Raupp, Treasuring, Trashing, or Terrorizing: Adult Outcomes of 
Childhood Socialization about Companion Animals, 7 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 141, 143 (1999). 
 189. Flynn, supra note 187, at 113. The forced social isolation of many victims 
of abuse may make the emotional support provided by pets even more important. 
Flynn, supra note 186, at 174. 
 190. See generally, Michael Robin et al., Abused Children and Their Pets, in THE 
PET CONNECTION: ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR HEALTH AND QUALITY OF LIFE 111 (Robert 
K. Anderson et al. eds., 1984). 
 191. See generally Flynn, supra note 187; Raupp, supra note 188. 
 192. Flynn, supra note 187, at 122. 
 193. Id. at 123. 
 194. Flynn, supra note 186, at 172. 
 195. Id. 
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mother thankfully neglected to forward them.196 
The enhanced penalties recognize the double victimization 
involved in such situations. They may protect human victims by 
providing an additional felony charge that may be brought against 
the abuser. Likewise, they can provide greater protection for the 
animal by encouraging reporting of cruelty. 
B.  A Blueprint for the Future 
Minnesota has taken some long overdue steps in modernizing 
its anti-cruelty statute. There are still, however, greater strides to be 
taken. Political reality prevents the enactment of truly sweeping 
changes,197 but there are a number of options that lawmakers 
should adopt. 
1.  Felony Provisions Should Apply to Abuse of All Animals. 
Companion animals and small wild animals are the most likely 
targets of cruelty, due to their availability to abusers.198 Wild 
animals, however, run a greater risk of being the victims of the 
most severe and sadistic forms of abuse.199 Weaker social 
prohibitions, combined with greater empathic distance, seem to 
“allow the expression of sadistic impulses among violence prone 
individuals.”200 Expansion of felony provisions would send the 
message that all cruelty is to be condemned and allow more 
appropriate punishment of transgressors. Such action would 
certainly engender much opposition from various special 
interests.201 Such hostility, however, would be unfounded. 
Minnesota’s anti-cruelty law currently contains no exemptions (e.g., 
 
 196. Jane Ann Quinlisk, Animal Abuse and Family Violence, in CHILD ABUSE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & ANIMAL ABUSE 168, 168 (Frank R. Ascione & Phil Arkow, 
eds., 1999). 
 197. See infra notes 239-254 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Alan R. Felthous & Stephen R. Kellert, Psychosocial Aspects of Selecting 
Animal Species for Physical Abuse, 32 J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 1713, 1714 (1987) (“A 
species that is well populated, lives in close proximity to people, and is easily 
subdued and captured will be more vulneralbe to abuse than a species that is not 
so available to human hands and weapons”). It is quite possible that abuse of wild 
animals is less likely to be reported, thereby underestimating its relative 
prevalence. 
 199. Id. at 1716-18. Among the types of abuse were dismemberment, 
explosion, and indiscriminate shooting. Id. at 1717. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Various animal (ab)use industries brought substantial pressure to this 
effect during the previous biennium. See supra note 137. 
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hunting, research, or agricultural)202 Enhancing the penalties for 
cruelty to all animals would not change this, nor would it abrogate 
currently legal activities.203 
2.  Penalties for Abusing Companion Animals Should be Increased 
Providing greater penalties for the abuse of service animals 
compared to companion animals focuses primarily on the value of 
the animal as human property rather than the harm to the animal. 
A pet whose legs are broken with a baseball bat suffers no less harm 
than a seeing-eye dog who bears the same abuse. Both acts should 
be condemned and punished to the same extent. The loss to the 
person, in either case, could be compensated through civil 
damages.204 
3.  Fines Should Support the Welfare of Animals 
Minnesota should follow the lead of Illinois and set up an 
Animal Abuse Fund.205 Under newly enacted legislation, 50% of the 
fines collected for felony and class C misdemeanor violations of the 
Illinois anti-cruelty law, and 20% of fines collected for other 
misdemeanor violations of the law, are deposited into this fund.206 
Such a fund in Minnesota would help provide assets for enhanced 
enforcement. Additionally, veterinary and related bills arising from 
the abuse of animals could be paid from this endowment.207 
 
 202. See MINN. STAT. § 343.21 (2000). 
 203. Current law reflects the paradoxical feelings that society harbors toward 
animals. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. For example, a person who 
shoots a stray dog with an arrow and allows it to bleed to death could be charged 
with a felony, but a person who commits the same violent and abusive act upon a 
deer (with proper licensing and during the proper time of year) suffers no legal 
consequences. “The concept of a humane hunting law is inherently self-
contradictory . . . .” Friend, supra note 27, at 211. 
 204. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. 
 205. See 2001 Ill. Laws 454, § 16 (codified as amended at 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
70/16.4 (2001)) (creating “a special fund in the state treasury . . . . to investigate 
animal cruelty and neglect). 
 206. 2001 Ill. Laws 454, § 10 (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
105/27.5(B) (2001). 
 207. Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victims’ Rights: Critical Concepts for Animal Rights, 7 
ANIMAL L. 19, 32-33 (2001) (“[I]t is unfair that victims . . . should bear the 
financial burden of the perpetrator’s criminal actions. . . . [A]nimals who are 
victims of criminal acts should have access to these funds via their human 
caretakers, agencies taking over animal care, or treating veterinarians.”). Id. at 32. 
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4.  Assistance in Sheltering Animals of Victims of Domestic Abuse. 
Concerns about what will happen to their pets leads some 
battered women to delay leaving, or causes them to return to, their 
abusers.208 If domestic abuse shelters provided facilities, even 
temporarily, for companion animals, victims might find it easier to 
leave violent situations. Such accommodations could be made in 
conjunction with local humane societies.209 Funds for such facilities 
should be provided by the state in an effort to reduce violence of 
all types. 
5.  Enhancement of Civil Damages. 
Illinois provides statutorily for the award of attorney’s fees and 
damages for emotional distress, as well as punitive damages of “not 
less than $500 but not more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or 
neglect to which the animal was subjected.”210 Historically, the 
Minnesota court has not awarded punitive damages for cases 
involving animal cruelty without personal injury.211 In Soucek v. 
Banham212 the court reasoned that because animals are property, 
punitive damages cannot be recovered for their loss, and 
compensatory damages are limited to fair market value.213 This 
ruling was indirectly overruled by Jensen v. Walsh,214 which allowed 
for punitive damages in cases where there is “deliberate disregard 
for the rights or safety of others”.215 This opens the door for the 
award of punitive damages in at least some animal cruelty cases. A 
statutory provision for such damages would further the social 
interests of punishment and deterrence.216 Allowing an award for 
emotional distress would likewise recognize the substantial bonds 
 
 208. See supra notes 191-196. 
 209. As an example, an animal shelter in Provo, Utah houses animals of 
battered women for up to two weeks until a permanent home can be found. 
Sauder, supra note 26, at 17. 
 210. 2001 Ill. Laws 454, § 16 (codified as amended at 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
70/16 (2001). 
 211. Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. App. 1994). But, cf., 
Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980) (allowing punitive damages 
where animal warden killed cat in violation of municipal ordinance). 
 212. 524 N.W.2d 478. 
 213. Id. at 481. 
 214. 623 N.W.2d 247 (Minn. 2001), rev’g 609 N.W.2d 251 (Minn. App. 2000). 
 215. 623 N.W.2d at 251 (emphasis in original) (stating that it was not the 
intention of the court that punitive damages claims be barred in all actions where 
the only damage is to property). 
 216. See id. (discussing the purposes of punitive damages). 
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that can exist between humans and other animals.217 
Minnesota’s updated anti-cruelty law provides a tool in the 
fight against animal abuse. Such tools, however, are only effective 
when officials make use of them. Getting them to do so can be a 
formidable task.218 
V. THE REALITY AND THE CHALLENGE 
A.  Ignoring Animal Cruelty 
[N]eglect, torture and destruction of helpless and usually 
inoffensive animals is so widespread and chronic in both 
history and contemporary society that one is tempted to 
conclude that cruelty to animals is a basic human instinct, 
only lightly obscured by a veneer of hypocritical platitudes 
and an occasional “Be Kind to Animals Week.”219 
- Charles E. Friend 
Assessing the extent of animal cruelty in the United States is 
very difficult.220 The Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals investigated about 80,000 reports of animal 
abuse and neglect between 1975 and 1996,221 but this is likely just 
the tip of the iceberg.222 Indeed, Sociology Professor Clifton Bryant 
has suggested that the violation of social norms regarding the 
treatment of animals “may well be among the most ubiquitous of 
any social deviance,”223 however little comprehensive data on the 
subject exists.224 “Because animal cruelty has traditionally been seen 
 
 217. See generally BECK & KATCHER, supra note 4, at 40-62 (discussing pets as 
members of the family). 
 218. See infra notes 255-267 and accompanying text. 
 219. Friend, supra note 27, at 201. 
 220. ARLUKE & SANDERS, supra note 3. 
 221. Arluke & Luke, supra note 5, at 197. 
 222. See generally id. 
 223. Bryant, supra note 3. 
 224. Arluke & Lockwood, Guest Editors’ Introduction: Understanding Cruelty to 
Animals, 5 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 183 (1997). See also Arluke & Luke, supra note 5, at 
196. This lack of data regarding “animal issues” is not limited to criminology; with 
a few exceptions, sociologists generally have ignored the role of animals in human 
society. See Bryant, supra note 3; Kruse: Relevance, supra note 3; Kruse: Expanding, 
supra note 3. This view is changing; in 2000 the American Sociological Association 
approve an Animals and Society “section-in-formation.” David Nibert & Anna 
Williams, Section-In-Formation Status Approved for Animals & Society, at 
http://www.asanet.org/sectionanimals/introfromdav.html (last updated Feb. 1, 
2001). 
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as a minor crime, basic quantitative information as to the nature 
and extent of animal cruelty has been limited.”225 
There are a number of reasons for this tendency to see the 
abuse of animals as an issue of little concern. Perhaps the most 
basic factor is the previously discussed property status of animals.226 
A closely related element is the legacy of Cartesian dualism that 
separates humans from the rest of nature.227 
Defining . . . nature relationally in terms of its lack of 
consciousness and agency opened the door to construing 
all things other than the human mind as homogeneously 
passive, inert matter. . . . Cartesian epistemology .  . . laid  
the groundwork for . . . hyperseparation of knower from 
known and subject from object. . . . [His] scientific 
methodology . . . made full use of these moves to cut 
nature off from us and strip it bare of its agency.228 
As Cartesian automata, animals are presumed to feel no 
pain,229 or in a more “modern” variant, not to experience pain in 
the same way as humans.230 The world is thus dichotomized into 
human and “other”; animals, as part of the latter category, are seen 
as unworthy of serious consideration.231 
Likewise, religious traditions have tended to minimize the 
problematization of animal abuse.232 Especially in Western religious 
thought, the non-human world is simply something to be 
subjugated for human ends.233 “[N]either Christianity . . . nor 
 
 225. Arluke & Lockwood, supra note 224, at 184. 
 226. See Friend, supra note 27. “The primary reason for this legal vacuum was 
the common law view that all animals were property belonging absolutely to the 
human owner and therefore subject to his slightest whim.” Id. at 201. 
 227. ARLUKE & SANDERS, supra note 3; Kruse: Relevance, supra note 3; Kruse: 
Expanding, supra note 3. 
 228. Ronnie Zoe Hawkins, Ecofeminism and Nonhumans: Continuity, Difference, 
Dualism, and Domination, 13 HYPATIA 158, 162 (1998). 
 229. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 38. Descartes and his followers suggested that 
the screams of animals were best compared to the noises that might be emitted by 
a malfunctioning machine. Id. See also Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal 
Rights, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 261 (1987)(discussing Descartes’ ideas 
regarding animals and pain). 
 230. Plous, supra note 3, at 26. 
 231. See Barbara Noske, The Question of Anthropocentrism in Anthropology, 13 
FOCAAL 66 (discussing the lack of attention paid by the social sciences to the role 
of animals in human society). 
 232. Beirne, supra note 85, at 120. 
 233. STEPHEN R KELLERT, THE VALUE OF LIFE: BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND HUMAN 
SOCIETY 132-42 (1996) (discussing the differences between Eastern and Western 
views of nature). This does not mean, of course, that Eastern cultures have been 
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Judaism encourages a strong censure of animal abuse because at 
both their respective doctrinal centers is a rigid hierarchical Chain 
of Being, in which God sits atop humans and humans bestride 
animals.”234 St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, taught that the ability 
to reason set humans apart from other animals.235 This perceived 
uniqueness was then used to justify human use of animals.236 
Perhaps because of this tradition, a number of individuals view the 
entire concept of cruelty to animals as little more than nonsense, 
and certainly nothing about which society should be concerned.237 
Even the deliberate torture and killing of animals is simply 
shrugged off.238 
 
uniformly kind to animals. Id. 
 234. Beirne, supra note 85, at 120. 
 235. Goodkin, supra note 229, at 270-71. This, of course, begs the question of 
how to classify those genetic “humans” who, due to accident, disease, disability, do 
not have the ability to reason. A similar question could be asked of Descartes. This 
raises the contentious issue of “personhood.” See Kruse: Expanding, supra note 3, 
at 3-4 (discussing research on symbolic interaction between humans and other 
animals). Some scholars suggest that it is not “rationality” or “mindedness” that is a 
prerequisite for intersubjective relations and, hence, the presumption of 
personhood; rather it is the attribution of mindedness and intent on the part of 
coactors that is important. See, e.g., ARLUKE & SANDERS, supra note 3, at 42-52 
(discussing the attribution of mindedness to animals by their human 
companions); R. Bogdan & S. Taylor, Relationships with Severely Disabled People: The 
Social Construction of Personhood, 36 SOC. PROBS. 135 (1989) (exploring how human 
identities are “assigned” to severely disabled individuals); Clinton Sanders, 
Understanding Dogs: Caretakers’ Attributions of Mindedness in Canine-Human 
Relationships, 22 J. OF CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 205-06 (1993) (discussing the 
attribution of mindedness to dogs). 
Understanding animals does not require us to conceive of “mind” as an 
“object” . . . “possessed” by nonhuman animals or people. . . . [M]ind is a 
social accomplishment [citations omitted]. The most appropriate route 
to understanding social interaction, be it human-to-human or 
nonhuman-to-human, is to focus on collective action as practical and 
premised on interactants’ . . . estimates of how others understand what is 
going on and how they would like things to proceed. 
ARLUKE & SANDERS, supra note 3, at 49. 
 236. Goodkin, supra note 229, at 270-71. 
 237. Friend, supra note 27, at 219-20. 
 238. See, e.g., Rob Zaleski, Brutal Cat Killings Divide Town, CAPITAL TIMES 
(Madison, WI), Dec. 17, 1997, at 1E. In March of 1997, two teenagers broke into 
the Noah’s Ark animal shelter in Fairfield, Iowa and bludgeoned 16 cats to death 
with baseball bats. Prosecution of the case caused substantial disagreement among 
Fairfield residents; while some felt that the boys should be punished severely, 
others believed that they should not be punished at all, characterizing the incident 
as boys simply being boys. Id.; see also Joyce Tischler, Zero Tolerance for Cruelty: An 
Approach to Enhancing Enforcement of State Anti-Cruelty Laws, in CHILD ABUSE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND ANIMAL ABUSE 297, 299-300 (Frank R. Ascione & Phil 
Arkow eds., 1999) (discussing the “boys will be boys” mentality). 
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Economics also play a significant role; the abuse of animals is 
an integral part of a number of highly profitable industries.239 
Organizations representing these industries form immensely 
powerful lobbies. 240 In the competition with animal protection 
organizations, such groups have a distinct advantage.241 
[Major] organizations concerned to defend the use of 
animals . . . either exist for reasons other than lobbying or 
are financed by those who so exist. As a consequence, they 
do not face the same kind of problems in mobilizing 
members and raising finance as do those animal 
protection groups that have been created specifically to 
promote the well-being of animals.242 
As a result, politicians are often reluctant “to support any new 
law which might possibly offend any voting” constituent engaged in 
these industries.243 
One unfortunate result is the exemption of “customary” or 
“accepted” agricultural practices from some state anti-cruelty 
statutes.244 Those who are subject to the law are thus allowed to 
exempt from it acts that would otherwise be illegal.245 This allows 
for the continued perpetration of inhumane acts, such as 
castration, branding, and debeaking,246 on many of the eight247 to 
nine billion248 farm animals killed for food every year in the United 
States.249 Some agricultural states have exempted livestock from 
their statutes.250 In an ironic reversal, the same “commercially 
valuable” animals that were the beneficiaries of the first anti-cruelty 
laws are now often excluded from them. 
“Necessity” language raises similar concerns; “[u]nder certain 
 
 239. Friend, supra note 27, at 202. 
 240. See GARNER, supra note 14, at 39-67 (discussing the economic and political 
influence of animal-use industries in Britain and the U.S.). 
 241. Id. at 64. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Friend, supra note 27, at 202. 
 244. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 10, 23-26. Minnesota is not currently among the 
states with such an exemption. See MINN. STAT. §§ 343.20-33 (2000). 
 245. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 10. 
 246. Debeaking is the practice of using hot cauterizing blades to remove the 
beaks of young chickens. Id. at 25. 
 247. Id. at 23 (citing U.S. Dept. of Agric. statistics). 
 248. Beirne, supra note 85, at 128 (citing U.S. Dept. of Agric. statistics). 
 249. Wolfson, supra note 5, at 10, 23-26. Some courts, at least in Britain, are 
casting a suspicious eye toward such concepts. See id. at 37-43 (discussing the 
European concerns over the intensive farming of animals). 
 250. Amy Kenna, Animal Abuse Laws that Bite, GOVERNING, Nov. 2000, at 52, 54. 
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circumstances, cruelty, and even torture, are not “cruelty” in the 
legal sense because the activity is “necessary” or “useful.”251 
Everyone wants to avoid “unnecessary” suffering;252 however, given 
the structure of our legal system as it pertains to animals, almost 
any type of animal exploitation can be framed as “necessary.”253 It is 
little wonder that Criminology Professor Piers Beirne suggests that 
“criminal law is a major structural and historical mechanism in the 
consolidation and institutionalization of animal abuse.”254 
B.  A Lack of Enforcement 
Even when laws are on the books, they may rarely be 
enforced.255 Police and county sheriffs’ offices typically give low 
priority to animal cruelty cases256, and seldom initiate 
prosecutions.257 Much of the enforcement of anti-cruelty laws thus 
falls to the local S.P.C.A. or a similar organization.258  Because most 
such groups are privately funded through donations, money is a 
continual problem.259 Even when investigations are begun, 
prosecutors often shy away from trying cruelty cases.260  “There is a 
tendency to avoid prosecution entirely, or, at best, to assign to the 
case the most junior assistant in the prosecutor’s office.”261 In many 
cases, prosecutors may view animal cruelty cases as a waste of 
resources.262 
 
 251. Friend, supra note 27, at 208. 
 252. FRANCIONE, supra note 7, at 32. 
 253. Id. at 26. Anti-cruelty laws “excuse any amount of agony if the sufferer is 
good to eat.” Friend, supra note 27, at 209. 
 254. Beirne, supra note 85, at 129. 
 255. Friend, supra note 27, at 215-20. 
 256. Id. at 216-17. Given the lack of resources many departments have to deal 
with criminal investigations, this low status likely arises out of necessity. Id. 
 257. Id. at 217. Officers are not typically trained to investigate cruelty cases. 
Tischler, supra note 238, at 297. 
 258. Friend, supra note 27, at 217. 
 259. Id. A few states provide some public funding, often from animal licensing 
fees or fines levied for violating laws relating to animals, but the majority of states 
do not. Id. 
 260. Id. at 218-20. 
 261. Id. at 220. 
 262. Tischler, supra note 238, at 297. There are attempts of change such views. 
For example, LEAP has published a guide for Minnesota prosecutors and judges 
entitled ANIMAL CRUELTY IN MINNESOTA: PUTTING AN END TO THE VIOLENCE. This 
publication is available through the LEAP website (http://www.leap-mn.org). As 
noted earlier, felony provisions may alter this calculus. See supra notes 169-172 and 
accompanying text. There are, of course, some prosecutors who strongly support 
the prosecution of cruelty cases. See, e.g., Boyd A. Beccue, Criminal Prosecution of 
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In cases where charges are brought, the court may be resistant. 
This may result in minimal punishment for the guilty defendant263 
or outright hostility to the prosecution.264 A lack of concern by the 
bench for animal cruelty may exist in many places, but seems 
especially prone to occur in rural areas.265 “Where hunting, 
trapping, and home slaughtering are so common as to be a way of 
life . . .” it is not surprising that the abuse of animals often elicits 
little judicial sympathy.266 One can only hope that such views will 
someday go the way of the outdated views the legal system once had 
of women and people of color.267 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thanks to the efforts of many groups and individuals,268 the 
animals of Minnesota have somewhat more protection against 
abuse than they previously did. It is unfortunate that the enhanced 
penalties apply only to crimes against service animals and pets or 
companion animals, but political realities make a more inclusive 
bill all but impossible at this time.269 The success of the new law 
depends upon the willingness of prosecutors to bring felony 
charges and the willingness of the court to impose appropriate 
penalties. 
Although strides have certainly been made in the protection of 
non-human animals, much more remains to be done. The words of 
 
Animal Neglect: Important Practice Notes, ANIMAL CRUELTY IN MINNESOTA: PUTTING AN 
END TO THE VIOLENCE § 2 (Pamela Finamore et al. eds., 2000) (“Perpetrators of 
animal abuse can and should be charged for each count of cruelty they commit”). 
 263. See Tischler, supra note 238, at 298. 
 264. Id. “One prosecutor told [the Animal Legal Defense Fund] of a judge 
who was enraged that she dared to take up his court time with such trivia as a 
cruelty case.” Id. 
 265. Friend, supra note 27, at 219-20. 
 266. Id. “Society could not long tolerate a system of laws which might drag to 
the criminal bar . . . every man who might drown a litter of kittens.” State v. 
Buford, 331 P.2d 1110, 1115 (N.M. 1958), (citing Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 
(1881)), quoted in Friend, supra note 27, at 220. Of course, judicial views, like those 
of prosecutors, are not monolithic. See, e.g., supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 267. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 451 (1856) (“the right of property 
in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution”). This reference 
is not intended to equivocate the practice of human slavery with society’s current 
use of animals; it is meant merely to provide an illustration of how views change 
over time. See generally SPEIGEL, supra note 12. 
 268. Special thanks should be given to Senator Don Betzold and 
Representative James Clark, the sponsors of the bill. 
 269. See supra notes 131-141 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Charles Friend ring no less true today than they did a 
quarter century ago. 
In an age which prides itself on technology, 
enlightenment, education, good will, and justice, we still 
treat the majority of the earth’s living creatures in a 
manner which is, in most respects, worthy of a medieval 
torturers’ guild.  That we continue to tolerate 
inhumanities of the type discussed in this article is an 
indictment of us all, and one which should weigh heavily 
on each and every human conscience.270 
 
 
 270. Friend, supra note 27, at 223. 
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